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NOTES AND COMMENT
The recent Virginia decision represents the broad and salutary general
philosophy that the courts, absent some clear restriction of law or of
public policy, ought not to block the attainment of human desires. For
so long a time as we shall have to operate under the present Section
122, it is to be hoped that this philosophy will prevail in its interpreta-
tion.
J. V. HUNTER
Criminal Law-Banishment
Recently a sentence of two years on the roads was suspended on
condition that the defendant leave the State of North Carolina for two
years. The Supreme Court of this State held that this was in all prac-
tical effect a sentence of banishment, and as such, was void.1 What
then is banishment, and how does it fit into our legal scheme of things?
In one form or another, banishment, or transportation, 2 has been
known in Europe from ancient times as a punishment for crime. In
one form, deportatio, it was introduced by Augustus into the Roman
law of that age and, gradually superceding exile,3 was by no means an
uncommon punishment.4 In another form, abjuration, it was known
in the kingdoms founded upon the wreckage of Imperial Rome5 and
later appeared in the early Anglo-Saxon laws of Alfred.6 The accused
would flee to a sanctuary, which generally was holy ground, where he
would confess his crime and swear to leave the realm, on no occasi6n
to return without permission from the Crown. This, Blackstone points
out, was not strictly a punishment, but rather was in the nature of a
"(1) The holder of an instrument may even without consideration discharge any
party
(a) by intentionally cancelling the instrument or the party's signature by
destruction or mutilation, or by writing 'cancelled' or equivalent words across
the instrument or against the signature; or(b) by renouncing his rights by a signed writing or by surrender of the
instrument to the party to be discharged.
"(2) Neither cancellation nor renunciation without surrender of the instrument
affects the title thereto." Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-605 (Official Draft
1952). Subsection (2) is difficult to comprehend and might well be clarified or
omitted in future drafts.
1 State v. Doughtie, 237 N. C. 368, 74 S. E. 2d 923 (1953).
2 It is unnecessary to distinguish here between banishment and transportation
since the result in each is the same. Technically, however, banishment "is in-
flicted principally upon political offenders, 'transportation' being the word used
to express a similar punishment of ordinary criminals. Banishment, however,
merely forbids the return of the person banished before the expiration of the
sentence, while transportation involves the idea of deprivation of liberty after
the convict arrives at the place to which he has been carried." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY, Banishment (4th ed. 1951).
'BUCKLAND, A TExT-Boox OF ROMAN LAW 98 (1921).
' 1 PIKE, A HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 16 (1876).
'3 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 303 (3rd ed. 1923).
e Laws of Alfred, c. 5, cited in 3 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 303
(3rd ed. 1923).
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condition to pardon.7 Because abjuration offered a means of escaping,
with one's head, the consequences of his crime, it became more an in-
centive to crime than a deterrent, and for this reason it was abolished
in 1604.8 It had one important effect, however: it established the
validity of the sovereign's attaching to a pardon the condition that one
pardoned leave a prescribed place, either for a specified term or for
life.9
From the reign of Charles II, banishment became a not infrequent
condition and has consistently been held valid since that time in the
courts of both Great Britain 0 and the United States." The usual
approach by the bench in recognizing its validity as a condition is that
the power of the sovereign (or in the United States, the executive) to
grant a pardon includes the lesser power to grant a conditional pardon,
so long as it is neither immoral, illegal, nor impossible of performance.12
Since such a condition is obviously neither immoral nor impossible, it
was argued in Ex parte Snyder' 3 that a condition that the parolee leave
the State of Oklahoma for twenty years was in conflict with the Consti-
tution of that State, which provides that "no person shall be transported
out of the state for any offense committed within the state. . . .,14 It
was held, however, that this was not involuntary transportation. Rather,
"the parole with all the conditions set forth therein was a matter which
'4 BLACKSTONI'S COMMENTARIES 332 (Sharswood's Ed. 1885) ; 8 C.J.S., Ban-
ishinent p. 385 (1938).
, "So much of all statutes as concerneth abjured persons and sanctuaries ...
shall stand repealed and be void." 1 JAMES I, c. 25, §34 (1604). See also 20
JAMES I, c. 18 (1624).
'8 C. J. S., Banishment p. 385 (1938). See also 7 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT 412,
as quoted in 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 40 (Sharswood's Ed. 1885). "It
seems agreed that the king may extend his mercy on whatever terms he pleases,
and consequently may annex to his pardon any condition that he thinks fit."
10 In one of the very earliest reported cases, the condition was that the criminal
"go beyond the seas for five years." Copeland's Case, J. Kel. 45, 84 Eng. Rep.
1075 (1665).
" State v. Fuller, 1 McCord 178 (S. C. 1821); State v. Chancellor, 1 Strob.
347 (S. C. 1847); State v. Barnes, 32 S. C. 14, 10 S. E. 611, 17 Am. St. Rep.
832 (1889) ; Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W. 106 (1895) ; Exr parte Sny-
der, 81 Okla. Cr. Rep. 34, 159 P. 2d 752 (1945). The above pardons were all
granted on condition that the prisoner leave the state. Perhaps the most interest-
ing condition was that "on or before the last of the said month of April," the
prisoner was to "depart from and out of the United States of America, and never
return to the same"-this from a state court. It was upheld on the ground that,
while the governor's authority did not extend beyond the borders of the state, it
was sufficient validly to impose such a condition. People v. Potter, 1 Parker, C. R.
47 (N. Y. 1845). The same conclusion has been reached in a Federal court.
Kavalin v. White, 44 F. 2d 49 (10th Cir. 1930).
12 Kavalin v. White, supra note 11. The power to grant pardons is provided
the governor by every state constitution. Power to grant conditional pardons is
generally granted by statute, but may be found in some state constitutions. For
example, the governor of North Carolina may grant pardons "subject to such
conditions, restrictions, and limitations as he thinks proper and necessary .
N. C. Co T. Art. III, § 6; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 147-23 (1952).
'
3 Ex parte Snyder, 81 Okla. Cr. Rep. 34, 159 P. 2d 752 (1945).
"OKLA. CoNsT. Art. II, § 29.
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the petitioner could accept or reject. He voluntarily [italics added] left
the state," hence, a lawful condition. It is upon this peg that most
courts hang their decisions.
On the other hand, banishment as a direct punishment has found
a less ready acceptance in the English-speaking world, although it is
today an integral part of the law of several nations, among which are
Spain,' 5 France,1' Italy,1 7 and the Philippines.' 8 While it was definitely
known as a punishment in England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Cen-
turies, it had become obsolescent by 1300, not being revived until the
practice of transporting criminals to the colonies was begun in 1597.19
In that year a statute was passed providing that convicted rogues, vaga-
bonds, and beggars "be banyshed out of this realm and all domynions
thereof."20 From that time until 1864, Parliament at frequent intervals
passed new statutes reaffirming the use of this punishment.
In the United States, however, banishment has not found even that
passing measure of acceptance. American decisions have held invalid
not only banishment from the country2' and the state,2 but also banish-
ment from the county,23 city, 4 and neighborhood 25 as well. In fact,
" Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146 (1902).0 Ibid. 17 Ibid. Is Ibid.
203 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 304 (3rd ed. 1923).
2°39 ELIZ. I, c. 4 (1597) ; see also 14 CA. II, c. 12, §§ 16, 23 (1662), re-
enacting the original statute. At this early date (1662), America -was the prin-
cipal recipient of banished convicts. After a lapse of forty-six years, transporta-
tion to America was restored on a greatly extended scale by 4 GEo. I, c. 11 (1717),
but was of course halted by the American Revolution. This practice was con-
tinued, Australia being the chief recipient, until it was gradually abolished be-
tween 1853 and 1864, primarily because of objections by the colonies themselves
to receiving convicts sentenced to them. IvEs, A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS
109, 146 (1914). See also 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRImINAL LAW OF ENG-
LAND 482 (1883).
1In People v. Lopez, 81 Cal. App. 100, 253 Pac. 169 (1927), the trial court
declared that "after sentence has been served, the defendant is to be deported to
Mexico." The appellate court said, "there is no authority of law by which the
state courts can make a valid order of this character .... It follows, therefore,
that the judgment is void." Id. at 103, 253 Pac. at 171.
2 People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930). The defendant was
ordered by the trial court to "leave the State of Michigan within thirty days
and not return for the period of probation," which was five years. The Supreme
Court said (in reversing) in unequivocal terms that "to permit one state to
dump its convict criminals into another would entitle the state believing itself
injured thereby to exercise its police and military power, in the interest of its
own peace, safety, and welfare, to repel such an invasion. It would tend to
incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental equality of
political rights among the several states which is the basis of the Union itself."
Id. at 189, 231 N.W. at 96.
" Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P. 2d 825 (1946). "The
same principle which prohibits the banishment of a criminal from a state or from
the United States applies with equal force to a county or city." Id. at 652, 173
P. 2d at 827.
24 Ibid.
25 People v. Smith et at., 252 Mich. 4, 232 N.W. 397 (1930). The defendants
were placed on probation and ordered to move out of the neighborhood in which
they lived. Held, that part of the order "was without authority of law." Id. at
5, 232 N.W. 397.
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the constitutions of several states expressly forbid it,20 and in states
not having such provisions, it is recognized that historically, banish-
ment was unknown to the common law2 7 and must therefore have
statutory sanction before being legally imposed.28  While no state has
such a statute, there seems to be little doubt that in those states having
no constitutional prohibitions against it, such a statute would receive
approval in the courts, as several cases and text-writers have inti-
mated.2 9 It is not likely that a statute of this type would be held uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it authorizes cruel and unusual punish-
ment, since it has been established on numerous occasions that, while
as a punishment banishment is unusual, it cannot be considered cruel.Y°
Chief among the objections that would probably arise would be that
it is contrary to sound public policy3 ' and that it violates Article IV,
§ 2, of the United States Constitution, dealing with the rights of citizen-
ship. It is highly doubtful whether such a sentence would serve any
practical purpose, however, since once beyond the borders of the state,
the convict would be beyond any effort of the state either to restrain
him or to aid in his rehabilitation.
The practical equivalent of banishment has of course been accom-
plished by means other than direct sentence, a practice which has led
to conflicting and sometimes confusing decisions. This is as true in
North Carolina as elsewhere. For example, where the defendant's sent-
ence was suspended for thirty days upon payment of costs with the fur-
ther provision that "if thereafter the defendant be found within the State
of North Carolina, capias shall issue . . . and upon apprehension the
defendant shall be committed to serve the sentence imposed,"8 2 the
court held that this was not a suspension of sentence on condition that
the defendant leave the state to avoid imposition of the sentence.8 3
Again, where the court ordered that the defendants "be imprisoned for
twelve months in the county jail, but if the defendants leave the state
"ARK. CONST. Art. II, § 21; GA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 7; ILL. CoNsr. Art. II, §
11; KAN s. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 12; N. C. CONST. Art. I, § 17; OHIO CoNsT.
Art. I, § 12; OKLA. CONsT. Art. II, § 29; TEx. CoNsT. Art. I, § 20.
"' BisHoP, CRIMINAL LAW § 939 (7th ed. 1882). See also Rex v. Lewis, 1
Moody, C. C. 372, 168 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1832); Bullock v. Dodds, 2 Barn. and
Ald. 258, 106 Eng. Rep. 361 (1819).
28 15 Am. JiR., Criminal Law § 453 (1938) ; 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1991
(1941).
29 Millsaps v. Strauss, 208 Ark. 265, 185 S.W. 2d 933 (1945) ; Ex pare Scar-
borough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P. 2d 825 (1946) ; People v. Baum, 251 Mich.
187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930) ; Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P. 2d 438 (1935);
Note, 26 ILL. L. REV. 81 (1931) ; 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1991 (1941).
" Ex parte Sheehan, supra note 29; Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146
(1902).
"1 The court said in People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 189, 231 N.W. 95, 96
(1930), "Such a method is . . . impliedly prohibited by public policy."
" State v. McAfee, 189 N. C. 320, 127 S.E. 204 (1925).
33 Ibid.
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within thirty days, no capias to issue," 34 the court held that this was not
a sentence of banishment.35 But recently in State v. Doughtie,36 the
court said,
A sentence of banishment is undoubtedly void. A sentence sus-
pended on cofidition that the defendant leave the State of North
Carolina is in all practical effect a sentence of banishment. It
gives the defendant no opportunity to avoid serving the road
sentence except by exile.
This would seem to indicate a trend by the court away from sentences
and conditions that by subtle interpretation result in banishment.3 7  It
certainly seems to recognize the fact that the place for the State's crim-
inals is within the borders of the State. Otherwise, these unwilling
expatriates would be foisted upon the no less unwilling citizens of other
states and any duty to restrain or rehabilitate them would go unattended.
MYRON C. BANKS
Labor Law-the Bargainability of Company Housing
Is company housing a subject of mandatory collective bargaining
within the purview of the terms "wages" and "conditions of employ-
ment" as used in Section 9 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act ?' In recent cases before the Courts of Appeals, a conflict has arisen,
the Fourth Circuit holding that company housing is2 and the Fifth Cir-
cuit that it is not3 bargainable.
" State v. Hatley et aL., 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892). See also. Ex
Parte Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 252, 72 S.E. 310, 311 (1911), where defendant was
told that if she left the county and did not return, she would not be imprisoned,
and the clerk -was directed not to issue capias for fifteen days, the court said,
"The opportunity which withholding of the catnias afforded defendant to escape
was not a decree of banishment. There was nothing requiring her to leave. If
she left, it was of her own free will and accord." Could this course be called
strictly voluntary, when the only other course open to the defendant is a term
in jail?
State v. Hatley et al., 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892).
a6237 N. C_. 368,74 S.E. 2d 923 (1953).
Yet the court indicates that this decision does not bear directly on the de-
cisions reached in State v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892) ; Ex parte
Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 72 S.E. 310 (1911) ; and State v. McAfee, 189 N. C. 320,
127 S.E. 204 (1925).
For other reasons holding invalid a suspension of sentence on condition that
the defendant leave a specified locale, see: Ex parte Scarborough, 73 Cal. App.
2d 648, 173 P. 2d 825 (1946) ("Unlawful increase of punishment not provided
by statute") ; Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P. 2d 438 (1935) ("In nature
of a pardon on condition . . . the court sought to exercise a power which the
Constitution reposes in the Governor and the board of pardons"); State v.
Doughtie, mtprac note 36 ("It is not sound public policy").
'29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (Supp. 1952).
'N. L. R. B. v. Portland Cement Co., 205 F. 2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953).3 N. L. R. B. v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. 2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953). The
Fifth Circuit did conclude, however, that the subject might be bargainable under
proper circumstances.
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